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INTRODUCTION
The Fukushima accident and the awareness towards 
climate change
There is a great number of existing definitions of nu-
clear safety culture; IAEA International Nuclear Safety 
Group (INSAG) says that “safety culture is that as-
sembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations 
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, protection and safety issues receive the atten-
tion warranted by their significance”. In line with this 
approach, in her first talk to the staff in January 2016, 
Fabiola Gianotti, who just began her mandate as CERN 
Director General, started her presentation with a dis-
cussion on safety. In the last decades one of the ma-
jor issues of discussion in the field of nuclear safety has 
been extreme (and rare) external events due to climate 
change (CC), which have proven to be some of the most 
serious initiators of degradation of defense-in-depth [1].
As a matter of fact, CC is not per-se a greater threat 
for workers with ionizing radiations (IRs) than for work-
ers in other fields, but it could have a severe impact 
on safety directly or indirectly causing accident condi-
tions, and the higher frequency and gravity of extreme 
weather events (EWEs) could lead to highly increased 
risks of exposure to IRs for workers.
The potential effects of EWEs on a nuclear power 
plant (NPP) were seen on March 11, 2011, when a ma-
jor nuclear accident occurred at Tokyo Electric Power 
Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP in Ja-
pan as a consequence of a huge tsunami that followed 
a massive earthquake: the combined effect caused the 
loss of off-site and on-site electrical power, so essential 
safety functions were lost at the plant, leading to core 
damage in three units and subsequently to considerable 
radioactive releases.
It was the worst emergency at a NPP since the Cher-
nobyl disaster in 1986, but, unlike the Three Mile Island 
(1979) and the Chernobyl accidents, the chain of fail-
ures that led to disaster at Fukushima was triggered by 
an extreme external event beyond design basis. There-
fore initially it was not a nuclear accident, but instead a 
NPP “under attack”, and the accident was in fact recog-
nized as the failure to prevent an accident that should 
have been addressed by appropriate safety measures.
Worldwide events have already shown that natural 
hazards can exceed the design basis for a NPP, but the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident has been an abrupt break 
in the overall trend towards higher safety in the sector of 
work with IRs, as it showed exposure and vulnerability 
to external events, in particular to flooding. Insufficient 
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The accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant (NPP) has been one of the dominant topic in nuclear safety and it has 
brought new attention on the matter of accidents in NPPs due to external events re-
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of extreme external events has increased exposure and vulnerability of workers in the 
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by external events.


















attention to external events and subsequent inadequacy 
of operating procedures caused complete loss of power, 
and then the lack of information on relevant safety pa-
rameters due to the unavailability of the necessary in-
struments and the loss of control devices. This means 
the impossibility to provide the fourth level of defense-
in-depth, that is prevention of the progression of severe 
accidents and mitigation of their consequences.
The Fukushima accident showed that natural hazards 
are fundamentally different from internal hazards, as 
external hazards may simultaneously affect the whole 
facility, including back up safety systems and human 
intervention, and so it has brought new awareness of 
hazards due to EWEs and of the importance of proper 
implementation of defense-in-depth principle.
On the other hand, according to the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change, climate warming is un-
equivocal, and severity of effects depends on exposure 
and vulnerability of the systems. In particular the CC 
in the Mediterranean area will make it a region of high 
exposure and vulnerability. 
As nuclear and radiation safety is the synergetic sum 
of several factors, there is an urgent need to undertake 
a comprehensive analysis of all external hazards as part 
of the design process and safety requirements for all fa-
cilities working with IRs, providing adequate protection 
against extreme weather conditions in the light of les-
sons learned to date from the accident at Fukushima. 
This article will then evaluate the risks for workers with 
IRs arising from CC impacts, bringing the conclusions 
also beyond the world of NPPs − to realities apparently 
more safe such as the hospitals, which, however, show a 
certain degree of vulnerability.
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SAFETY 
AT WORK WITH IONIZING RADIATIONS
Changes in many extreme weather and climate 
events have been observed since about 1950 [2], and 
globally the number of weather-related natural disasters 
have more than tripled since the 1960s [3]. CC actually 
increases the risk of events like storms, droughts and 
floods, cyclical changes in precipitation, or long-term 
changes in temperature and sea levels [4], also modify-
ing the frequency, intensity, duration, timing and spa-
tial extent of extreme events. CC then could act as a 
significant “risk multiplier”, and impacts of CC on safe 
operations of NPPs have been recognized by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [5]. 
As a matter of fact, in the last decade EWEs have 
proven to be a real threat to the three fundamental safe-
ty functions in nuclear and radiological facilities, which 
are the control of reactivity in the nuclear fuel, the re-
moval of heat from the reactor core and spent fuel pool, 
and the confinement of radioactive material, by both 
affecting the availability of water resources and caus-
ing deep damages to key buildings (e.g. those housing 
instrumentation and equipment) and control systems. 
Moreover, the impact of EWEs on the surroundings of 
the facilities can also impair emergency preparedness 
and response, which are critical issues in handling nu-
clear or radiological emergencies.
Flood hazards in particular have been recognized as 
one of the most threatening disasters, firstly because 
they are related to several extreme meteorological phe-
nomena, such as local extreme rainfall, off-site precipi-
tation with waters routed to the site (besides models 
show an intensification of heavy precipitations in the 
future [6]), obstruction of a river channel by landslides, 
logs or debris, tornadoes, hurricanes and storm surges 
on the coasts, etc. Secondly, their repercussions at the 
site of a plant can be severe, as water collecting on roof-
tops or in low lying plant areas is a common cause of 
failure for safety related systems, and masses of water 
and accompanying debris can damage buildings and 
cause electrical shorts (with the subsequent disruption 
of other systems). 
Furthermore, as it has been outlined, the flooding 
may involve also external infrastructures, causing power 
outages and affecting communication and transport 
networks around the plant site, eventually hampering 
emergency response and procedures. In the case of tor-
nadoes, besides the other flood hazards it has also to be 
considered the risk of the striking of a missiles, i.e. flying 
objects transported by the tornado, among the poten-
tial hazards for the vulnerable critical areas of a plant.
Many NPPs as well as many radiological facilities 
(e.g. hospitals) in the world are also exposed to the 
above mentioned risks related to hurricanes and storm 
surges as the former can be located in low-lying coastal 
areas and the latter in coastal towns. 
As an illustrative example of flood’s impact, the chain 
of events of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP on 
March 2011 can be shortly illustrated. The flooding, in 
this case resulting from the tsunami, was the cause of 
failure of the emergency power supply system, which, 
added to the previous loss of off-site electrical power, 
led to the station blackout and the subsequent near 
complete loss of systems providing DC power to mea-
suring and control devices, and the destruction of the 
structures and components providing seawater cooling 
for the plant. This lack of cooling resulted in explosions 
and partial meltdowns at the plant facility, with prob-
lems at all six reactor units and the central spent fuel 
pools, and then in the release, over a prolonged period, 
of large amounts of radioactive material into the envi-
ronment. The only emergency diesel generator unaf-
fected by the flooding was that of Unit 6, located on 
the first floor of a separate diesel generator building at 
higher elevation with respect to the others, where gen-
erators were at ground floor.
Impacts on the surroundings are not less important: 
at Fukushima, backup power supplies (batteries or 
generators) from different locations could not be trans-
ported to the plant, since the roads that had not been 
damaged were jammed with cars fleeing the disaster 
sites − workers had to use their car batteries and plug 
them into the instrument panels in the control room. 
The same situation happened for instance in Florida 
in 1992: during the hurricane, access roads around 
the Turkey Point NPP were blocked and, even though 
emergency diesel generators maintained the plant dur-
ing the loss of power, helicopters had to be used for fuel 
[1]. Moreover, the effects of such EWEs can create dif-
ficulties for the emergency response personnel to get to 


















the plant site, as it happened during the flood in 1999 
at Blayais NPP. 
These risks however are not limited to NPPs, but in-
volve all facilities working with IRs, also in those coun-
tries that do not exploit nuclear energy. 
In many hospitals the nuclear medicine units (NMU) 
and the brachytherapy units (BU) are located in un-
derground areas, extremely vulnerable to incoming 
water in case of flooding. In NMUs large amounts of 
unsealed radioactive sources are stored both for diag-
nosis (99mTc, 67Ga, 201Tl, 123I, etc.) and metabolic radia-
tion therapy (131I, 90Y, 177Lu, 186Re). In BUs sealed high 
activity sources are present for radiation therapy (192Ir, 
103Pd, 125I, 106Ru, etc.). Moreover, the presence of a com-
mercial blood irradiator with a source of 137Cs could be 
one of the potential causes of exposure of workers, as 
the Cs source is contained in a case made of lead, and if 
the room is flooded the case could capsize and disperse 
the radioactive source into the environment. The same 
could occur for example with 63Ni sources for gas chro-
matography and especially with 192Ir portable sources 
used in industry for gamma radiography to locate flaws 
in metal components, as due to a flooding the source 
could end up submerged in mud and debris or dragged 
away. This may result in an undue exposure either dur-
ing search operations or for a casual finding after the 
accidental event, as it happened for example in Egypt in 
2000 when a lost 192Ir source caused serious exposure of 
more than one hundred people in a village [7].
In particular, areas for the storage of radioactive 
waste from diagnostic and therapeutic NMUs are often 
in detached underground areas. If the area containing 
the tanks for liquid waste and Imhoff tanks is inundat-
ed with water from a flooding or infiltrations from the 
roof (not always with an adequate impermeabilization), 
there is the risk of overflow of waste from the tanks and 
dispersion of radioactive material in the environment. 
The safety system would detect the presence of water 
on the floor as an accident due to an overflow of waste 
from one of the tanks, and then the content of the full 
tank would be discharged in the empty ones; however, 
there could be a malfunction of the automatic safety 
system due to water in close proximity to switchboards 
and electrical cables, so workers should manually in-
tervene and activate the safety systems, as long as the 
switchboards and control panels are still attainable. It 
could also happen that, if the tanks are not fixed to the 
ground and the room is flooded, the tanks may float in 
the water, pouring out the liquid waste and spreading 
radioactive contamination.
Since NMUs are located within hospital complexes, 
the potential dispersion of contamination would affect 
workers and population of the entire hospital, and, in 
case of flooding, the radioactive waste could be carried 
away because of streams of water forming along streets. 
Moreover, even in hospitals emergency diesel genera-
tors are often housed in underground rooms, exposed 
to the risks of flooding, with all the already mentioned 
consequences for the safety systems and automatic 
controls in the NMUs, as it happened in some hospitals 
during hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Another effect of CC to be taken into account is that 
the length and frequency of warm spells, including heat 
waves, have increased since the middle of the 20th cen-
tury in large parts of Europe, Asia, and Australia and 
many simulation models anticipate an increase in their 
duration, intensity and spatial extent. Frequency and 
intensity of drought has also increased in the Mediter-
ranean during recent decades [8].
Heat waves, high temperatures and eventually 
drought may cause higher river water temperatures and 
lower water level in rivers during summer, finally result-
ing in water scarcity and a lack in water supply. Water 
however is a basic resource for NPPs, as they need large 
amount of water in order to ensure both cooling of the 
reactor core and operativeness of the safety systems, 
and this requirement for long term core cooling is the 
reason why NPPs are always placed near consistent wa-
ter sources as oceans, lakes or rivers.
In the last ten years, for example during dry summers 
of 2003, 2006 and 2009, reactors in several countries 
had to be shut down or reduce energy production due 
to the limited availability of cooling water. In summer 
of 2003 more than 30 NPPs in Europe had to operate 
at reduced capability because of water supply shortag-
es, however some plants got exemptions from legal re-
quirements to be able to continue their operating activi-
ties [9], with all the ensuing consequences for the safety 
of workers and also increased risk for the surrounding 
population and environment as well.
Moreover, drought may trigger wildfires: for instance, 
in the Western United States, since 1986, longer, warm-
er summers have resulted in a fourfold increase of ma-
jor wildfires and a sixfold increase in the area of forest 
burned, compared with the period from 1970 to 1986 
[10]. An indirect impact on all radiological and nuclear 
facilities is that smoke from wildfires can be blown to 
the site, damaging sensitive equipment and ventilation 
systems, and making access to the site extremely dif-
ficult for supply deliveries and critical personnel such as 
emergency response workers, as it happened at Cada-
rache Laboratories in France in 1989 [1].
Furthermore, the potential impact on different safe-
ty-related systems of a fire reaching a plant can be en-
visaged on the basis of the events following the cable-
tray fire at Browns Ferry Unit One nuclear reactor in 
1975, which caused multiple-system failures: the fire 
damaged many of the control cables, so that, despite 
redundancies, the emergency core cooling system was 
lost and normal cooling to the reactor fuel hampered, 
even though some cooling systems remained operative 
allowing to avoid core meltdown [11].
As concluding remarks it has to be considered that 
the lifetime of an NPP, including the decommissioning 
time, is more than 100 years, so NPPs and radioactive 
waste repositories are potentially vulnerable not only to 
occasional EWEs but also to slow and gradual CC im-
pacts, such as sea level rise (which can affect NPPs lo-
cated in coastal regions), coastal erosion or geomorphic 
changes like river course alterations. In particular for 
repositories it is extremely difficult to develop a credible 
safety assessment for a specific site because of the im-
pacts of CC on the water cycle, for example designing 
the protection of repositories on the basis of the pace of 


















sea-level rise or modelling how water could infiltrate a 
deep geological repository.
Most of the above mentioned risks are present in 
Italy because, even if civilian use of the nuclear energy 
for production of electricity was banned in 1987, Italy is 
the most “nuclear” of the “non-nuclear” countries, with, 
among other installations, four NPPs under decommis-
sioning, a planned radioactive waste repository and sev-
eral thousands of workers exposed to the risks of IRs in 
many different radiological facilities. Besides, while on 
the Italian territory nuclear accidents involving NPPs 
are not possible, as the few existing NPPs are currently 
dismissing, countries like France, Switzerland and Slo-
venia are equipped with NPPs, some of them close to 
the Italian borders. Therefore hypothetical nuclear ac-
cidents involving these facilities may require emergency 
actions and delayed remediation activities also on the 
Italian territory and potentially involving emergency 
workers even from Italy. Moreover, Italy has a high 
grade of exposure to CC, as it is located in the Mediter-
ranean basin, which has been identified as a “hotspot” 
for CC where environmental impacts are more relevant 
than in other regions in the world [12].
HAZARDS TO WORKERS
Extreme weather events due to CC can substantially 
increase the risk of exposure for workers with IRs, with 
their potential to cause emergency conditions and then 
harsh and critical environments with which workers 
have to cope. 
Even though EWEs have a very low probability of oc-
currence they can result in significant consequences. The 
correlated risk, defined as the probability of occurrence 
of an event multiplied by the size of the damage (R = 
P·D), could be similar to that of common events in the 
working routine of NPPs characterized by high probabil-
ity of occurrence and limited size of the damage.
The Fukushima Daiichi accident demonstrated 
what could be the potential impact of extreme natu-
ral hazards on NPPs and facilities dealing with IRs, 
showing in particular vulnerability of safety systems to 
flooding. A systematic identification and assessment 
of external hazards and robust protection against them 
needs therefore to consider the lessons learned after 
that accident. 
Exposure to radionuclides
In the early phase of a nuclear or radiological acci-
dent the most significant contributor to the exposure of 
workers involved in emergency operations are external 
and internal exposure from radionuclides in the plume 
and deposited on the ground, the greatest source of in-
take of radionuclides being the inhalation. 
At Fukushima, the noble gases 85Kr and 133Xe contrib-
uted to external exposure from the plume, the longer 
lived 134Cs and 137Cs to both external and internal ex-
posure, while the intake of 131I, despite its short half-
life, can give rise to relatively high equivalent doses to 
the thyroid gland. These are the same radionuclides re-
leased from the reactor that mainly caused exposure of 
individuals after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear 
reactor, occurred on 26 April 1986. 
So in the short term 137Cs and 131I, together with 134Cs, 
give by far the largest contribution to the exposure of 
workers, while in the long term the most important 
contributor is the external radiation from the deposited 
137Cs. In particular, 50% of inhaled 131I is exhaled, and 
the rest quickly reaches the bloodstream; then 30% is 
absorbed by the thyroid gland in a day and 70% is ex-
creted in the same time. Due to the short time it is criti-
cal to provide medical care to the exposed workers, and 
the use of stable iodine for thyroid blocking within the 
first 24 hours is often needed.
In order to deal with the emergency at Fukushima, 
immediately after the accident an effective dose refer-
ence level of 100 mSv was adopted by the government 
for the workers involved, and it was raised to 250 mSv 
on 14 March 2011 due to the particular circumstanc-
es. These constraints are in line with the internation-
ally recommended reference levels by the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and 
the requirements in the IAEA safety standards, which 
suggest a guidance value of 500 mSv for persons en-
gaged in emergency activities aimed at preventing fur-
ther worsening of a nuclear accident.
Harsh environmental conditions and related 
occupational health and safety (OHS) risks
Apart from the radioactive release, EWEs may cause 
widespread destruction of many buildings, roads, and 
other infrastructures around the plant site, so workers 
involved in emergency operations may face a complete 
and prolonged loss of electrical power, instrumentation, 
reactor control, and communications systems both 
within and outside the site.
In these extreme working conditions, operators in the 
early phase of the accident (days to few weeks) have to 
mitigate the radiological consequences and further pro-
gression of the accident, for example restoring the cool-
ing system by reestablishing electrical power, and then 
take care of reactor stabilization and water decontamina-
tion. Afterwards, materials affected by the accident − i.e. 
debris, sludge from the water and sewage treatments, 
incinerated ash, trees, plants and soil resulting from de-
contamination activities – have to be disposed of.
Moreover, if a nuclear accident affects the environ-
ment surrounding the facility, after the management of 
the acute phase, remediation activities may require the 
employment of potentially large numbers of workers 
for long periods (weeks, months or even tens of years). 
These outdoor workers are not only exposed to radiation 
but also to a potentially increased levels of environmen-
tal agents, such as solar UV radiation or organic pollut-
ants, with an increased risk for health outcomes arising 
from combined exposure to radiation and other chemi-
cal or physical agents, if an adequate personal protec-
tion and a proper medical surveillance are lacking.
Personal protection is imperative in the case of re-
mediation activities with exposure to IRs as medical 
surveillance is. However, a more challenging thermal 
environment due to CC may alter the compliance with 
personal protective devices, impairing the optimization 
of radiation protection as well as the effective protec-
tion against other pollutants. 


















In the case of Fukushima, by the end of October 
2012 24 832 workers had been involved in mitiga-
tion and other activities at the NPP site; about 15% 
of them were employed directly by the plant operator 
(TEPCO), while the rest were employed by contractors 
or subcontractors. In addition, a few hundred workers 
from the emergency services were deployed for on-site 
and off-site operations, including fire-fighters, police 
and personnel of the Self-Defense Force. 
Implementation of the arrangements for ensuring the 
protection of workers against radiation exposure was 
severely affected by the extreme conditions at the site. 
Following the external EWE, operators had to work ex-
ceptionally long hours exposed to traditional OHS risks 
including heat, stress, explosion and fire as well as ra-
diation. They had to secure the safety of the reactors 
and the nuclear fuel storage pools coping with loss of 
almost all power supplies, lack of proper equipment, 
loss of all safety systems including instrumentation and 
control. Additionally, many emergency workers came 
from different professions, but not all of them had been 
designated before the emergency nor had been trained 
to work in conditions of a nuclear emergency. As a mat-
ter of fact, in the early phase of the accident the main 
contributor to effective doses was internal exposure due 
to the intake of radionuclides, which may be attributed 
not only to the extreme working conditions but also to 
the inadequate implementation of protective measures, 
primarily attributable to the inadequacy of training [13].
Because of food and water shortages workers were 
provided with minimal nutrition and medical manage-
ment; in addition the provision of personal protective 
equipment was severely affected. 
Workers were exposed to radionuclides, predomi-
nantly in the form of airborne activity as a result of 
the hydrogen explosions and the continuing releases 
of radioactive material from the damaged reactors, so 
many of them had to work outdoors wearing double-
layer Tyvek protective overalls and full-face respirators, 
causing heat exposure to become a supplementary im-
portant hazard.
Loss of radiological monitoring 
Notwithstanding the high radiation levels, the ca-
pabilities for monitoring radiological conditions effec-
tively, both on-site and off-site, may be severely ham-
pered by EWEs: flooding may cause the loss of personal 
dosimeters, computer systems for recording dose from 
these devices, and portable survey instruments, while 
installed radiation monitors may be down due to the 
loss of electrical power, so it is not possible to gather 
information on controlled areas or on personal doses. 
Consequently emergency operations can be impaired 
as airborne and surface contaminations cannot be de-
tected and workers cannot evaluate risks correlated to 
possible remedy actions. 
At Fukushima, between 12 March and 1 April 2011 
emergency operators had to share electronic personal 
dosimeters, with only one worker in a team wearing a 
dosimeter, and workers logging their individual doses 
manually, until after 1 April when personal dosimeters 
were provided to each worker.
The lack of information due to the unavailability of 
the necessary instruments because of the flooding is a 
critical issue for safety management: first of all, it ham-
pers the prompt quantification and characterization of 
the amount and composition of the radioactive release 
and impairs the protective actions to be implemented 
and continuously modified in response to developing 
plant conditions or monitoring results.
Moreover the failure of a proper monitoring of ex-
posure makes it difficult to draw health consequences 
for workers involved. Early and continued direct mea-
surements of the radiation exposure and the levels of 
radionuclides incorporated are necessary for estimating 
radiation risks and potential health effects and for op-
timizing protection. In particular, while the assessment 
of external exposure is possible on the basis of informa-
tion provided by electronic personal dosimeters, even 
using a single personal dosimeter per group of emergen-
cy workers expected to operate in similar conditions, 
internal exposure assessments rely on the assumed ex-
posure scenario as well as on the use of complex models 
and software, thus giving rise to a greater uncertainty in 
the case of EWEs.
In the emergency conditions of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident, in vivo measurements were possible only 
with a mobile whole-body counter at Onahama, 55 km 
south of the NPP site, with all the difficulties due to 
the large number of workers to be monitored and the 
relatively high environmental background. Results were 
reported only for 131I, 134Cs and 137Cs; for some workers 
with higher effective doses results were also reported 
for 136Cs and 129mTe. For most of the workers in vivo mon-
itoring of 131I in the thyroid did not start until mid- to 
late-May: this delay in starting monitoring increases the 
uncertainty in dose assessments. 
According to the records [14], the average effec-
tive dose of the about 25 000 workers over the first 19 
months after the accident (between 11 March 2011 and 
31 October 2012) was about 12 mSv. About 35% re-
ceived total doses greater than 10 mSv, while 0.7% of 
the workforce (174 individuals, mainly TEPCO work-
ers) received doses greater than 100 mSv. Six TEPCO 
workers received cumulative doses greater than 250 
mSv. For comparison, average effective doses to those 
persons most affected by the accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor were assessed to be about 120 mSv for 
530 000 recovery operation workers, with maximum re-
corded worker doses of more than 1000 mSv and 85% 
of recorded doses between 20 and 500 mSv [15].
The highest reported effective dose was 679 mSv for 
the TEPCO worker who also had received the highest 
reported committed effective dose due to internal ex-
posure (590 mSv). The highest reported effective dose 
due to external exposure was 199 mSv for a contrac-
tor’s worker who had a total reported effective dose of 
238 mSv. Female workers were not allowed to enter the 
plant after the accident. None of the firefighters, police 
and Self-Defense Force personnel involved in on-site 
emergency activities received effective doses in excess 
of 100 mSv, the majority receiving effective doses of less 
than 10 mSv.
The available information indicates zero confirmed 


















fatalities from radiation exposure so far and that no in-
dividual received a dose at or above the threshold levels 
for acute radiation effects; however, thirteen workers 
were estimated to have received absorbed doses to the 
thyroid in the range of 2 to 12 Gy from inhalation of 131I, 
with an average dose of about 5 Gy.
Among the group of workers who received effective 
doses over 100 mSv, an increased risk of cancer would 
be expected in the future. However, “any increased in-
cidence of cancer in this group is expected to be indis-
cernible because of the difficulty of confirming such a 
small incidence against the normal statistical fluctua-
tions in cancer incidence” [16].
Health risks from exposure to low levels of ionizing 
radiations
The system of radiological protection is based on 
three leading principles: justification, optimization and 
dose limitation. In the formulation of ICRP they are 
defined as follow [17].
•  Justification: “Any decision that alters the radiation 
exposure situation should do more good than harm”, 
that is the benefits obtained by the use of IR or in situ-
ation implying the exposure to IR have to be greater 
than the risk to health and environment due to radia-
tion exposure.
•  Optimisation of protection: “The likelihood of incurring 
exposure, the number of people exposed, and the mag-
nitude of their individual doses should all be kept as low 
as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic 
and societal factors”. This is not a mere minimization 
approach, but a principle aimed at reducing the overall 
exposure to IR harmonized with other individual, social 
and economic needs. 
•  Application of dose limits: “The total dose to any indi-
vidual from regulated sources in planned exposure situ-
ations other than medical exposure of patients should 
not exceed the appropriate limits specified by the Com-
mission”. 
These principles, the last two in particular, are based 
on the so-called linear non threshold model (LNT) 
applied to stochastic effects of radiation: cancer and 
transmissible deleterious mutations. For doses below 
100-200 mSv the model states that the risk is linearly 
correlated to the dose without a threshold, i.e. a small 
dose has a little but finite probability to induce the ef-
fect, being the risk equal to that of background when 
the dose approaches zero. 
For higher doses deterministic (or non stochastic) ef-
fects, the so-called tissue reactions, may start to take 
place. They are threshold effects, but their occurrence 
is unlikely also in overexposure situations (for instance 
during emergencies) up to effective doses of 500 mSv 
(with the possible exception of the cataract, see below), 
and then are not expected in the occupational and envi-
ronmental exposure conditions discussed in this paper. 
The LNT assumption is adopted by the ICRP and 
other international and national bodies sharing the 
ICRP approach (including the European Union). Its 
utility is intended only for the scopes of radiological 
protection, as any application of the LNT hypothesis for 
individual risk predictions or epidemiological purposes 
is improper. The LNT model derives risk estimates (i.e. 
detrimental coefficients for each organ/site involved in 
radiation-induced cancer) extrapolating, from medium-
high to low doses, epidemiological data largely acquired 
by the follow up of the Japanese atomic bomb survivors 
(Life Span Study) [17], adjusting for acute vs protracted 
exposure and for populations different from the Japa-
nese one. The overall risk coefficient for cancer induc-
tion in adults is 5 x 10-2 Sv-1, while for children is three 
fold higher. Epidemiological data from atomic bomb 
survivors are unable to detect any increase in cancer risk 
at doses lower than 100 mSv. 
A recently published study on a cohort of over 300 
000 radiation-monitored workers in US, France and 
UK (pooled data) with a total follow up of 8.22 million 
person-years [18] shows a substantial risk increase for 
leukemia (excluding chronic lymphocytic leukemia) for 
cumulative bone marrow doses above 200 mGy (exter-
nal penetrating radiation, primarily γ rays), with a linear 
trend in all dose ranges and an estimated excess relative 
risk (ERR) of mortality caused by leukemia of 2.96 per 
Gy (90% CI 1.17-5.21), similar to that of the atomic 
bomb survivors (ERR = 2.63 at 1 Sv, 90% CI 1.50-4.27). 
Therefore, a risk increase due to chronic radiation expo-
sure quantitatively similar to that obtained from atomic 
bomb survivors acutely exposed to radiation was es-
tablished, at least for leukemia. This study displayed 
a stronger and more precise association between pro-
tracted radiation exposure and risk of leukemia occur-
rence, except for chronic lymphocytic leukemia, with 
respect to a previous large study conducted in 15 coun-
tries on workers chronically exposed to radiation [19]. 
However, at cumulative doses below 100 mGy the ob-
served risk increase as a function of the increasing dose 
is not significant, given wider confidence intervals. The 
same cohort was also analysed with regard to overall 
cancer mortality and mortality for solid cancers [20]. 
Data have shown an increased risk of cancer, quantified 
in an excess relative rate of 0.48 (90% CI 0.20-0.79) 
per Gy of cumulative colon dose (external exposure to 
high energy photons) for overall cancer deaths, an es-
timate larger but statistically compatible with that one 
obtained in the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. Es-
timates are similar when the analyses were conducted 
excluding the smoking induced cancers (primarily the 
lung cancer) and the asbestos induced cancers (lung 
and pleura), as well as when data are disaggregated by 
country and when the cohort is stratified with regard to 
the suspected or known exposure to radionuclides or 
neutrons. A linear dose-response relationship provides 
a reasonable description of data, but in correspondence 
of 100, 150 and 200 mGy of cumulative dose (ranges 
involving the vast majority of the over 19 000 cases of 
cancer deaths reported at the end of the follow up) the 
estimates are less precise, although a linear trend in risk 
increase with dose is recognizable.
Linear extrapolations to the low dose range (< 100 
mSv) are not supported by sound scientific evidence. On 
the opposite, in the last decades radiobiological studies 
in vitro but also in vivo display the existence of nonlinear 
responses at low doses (Figure 1), such as those char-
acterizing non targeted effects (the so-called bystander 


















effect), genomic instability or adaptive responses [16, 
21-23], all biological effects involving additional ac-
tion mechanisms with respect to the induced gene 
mutations, in the frame of a complex and only partially 
elucidated scenario of reactive oxygen species (ROS) 
production, mithocondrial-nuclear interplay, epigen-
etic alterations, synthesis and release of cytochines etc. 
From an epidemiological point of view several studies 
(see for instance the recent analysis of [24]) on popu-
lations resident in geographical areas characterized by 
high levels of background natural radiation (up to doses 
of some hundreds mSv per years) did not show an in-
crease in cancer risk proportional to the dose on the 
basis of LNT model, but seem to suggest an adaptive 
response to these high levels of IR, with even a reduc-
tion in the background risk of cancer. Similar conclu-
sions are proposed by some authors (for instance [25]) 
examining in detail the shape of the dose-response rela-
tionship for leukemia and solid cancers in the low dose 
range in Japanese atomic bomb survivors.
In any case, the definition of the shape of dose-re-
sponse relationship at low doses (see for instance [26]) 
as well as at low dose rates in subjects chronically ex-
posed to radiation (but, by extension, to environmental 
or occupational mutagenic and carcinogenic agents) 
and the difficulties of epidemiological investigations to 
assess small excess in cancer risk (typically relative risks 
below 1.2-1.3) has been repeatedly recognized, also in 
relation to the follow up of populations involved in fa-
talities such as nuclear accidents (see for instance [27] 
with regard to the Fukushima accident). 
However, a case of risk quantification and definition 
of a clear dose-response relationship at low dose rates 
is the lung cancer with regard to prolonged exposure to 
indoor radon. A collaborative analysis of 13 case-con-
trol studies conducted in European countries [28] has 
shown that the risk of lung cancer for radon exposure 
in dwellings increases of 16% every 100 Bq/m3 of mean 
exposure to indoor radon and its progeny in the year 
(ERR = 0.16; 95% CI 0.05-0.31), with a linear dose-
response relationship. These results are similar to those 
obtained by a combined analysis of North American 
case-control studies on residential radon and lung can-
cer (ERR = 0.18; 95% CI 002-0.43 at 100 Bq/m3) [29] 
and by the analysis of two Chinese case-control studies 
(OR = 1.32; 95% CI 1.07-1.91 at 100 Bq/m3 for sub-
jects resident in the current home for 30 years or more) 
[30]. The advantages of residential studies (which also 
included a detailed assessment of the effects of smoking 
on radon cancer risk estimates) is the lack of confound-
ing factors potentially affecting studies on lung cancer 
in miners exposed to radon. The conversion of an activ-
ity concentration (in Bq/m3) into an effective dose to 
the lung (in Sv) is affected by uncertainties, depending 
on the dosimetric model (for instance the application 
of the human respiratory tract model) and the exposure 
conditions [31]. However, the order of magnitude of 
the effective dose corresponding to 100 Bq/m3 is in the 
range of few mSv, so falling in the typical low dose range 
of exposure.
A case where an increased cancer risk has been ob-
served in the dose range < 100 mSv is the childhood can-
cer in relation to diagnostic prenatal exposure to IR (X 
rays). The Oxford Survey of Childhood Cancer (OSCC) 
and other studies conducted in the past decades and re-
viewed by the publication 90 of the ICRP [32] indicate 
a significant increase in the risk of leukaemia and other 
neoplasms in children whose mothers were exposed to 
diagnostic X rays during pregnancy. These studies have 
a number of methodological limitations, including the 
largest one (the OSCC study), and dose estimates are 
often uncertain, especially for exposures occurred in the 
farthest decades which the studies referred to. However, 
the risk was significantly increased for both childhood 
leukaemia and solid cancers when the OSCC study is 
considered alone or in combination with the other ones 
or when the other studies are taken together excluding 
the OSCC study. Medical doses used in radiodiagnostic 
Background incidence of the outcome considered 
(Relative risk = 1)  
Effective dose
Incidence 






























Possible dose-response relationships at low doses for biological and health effects of ionizing radiation. 


















practices are constantly decreased over time, but they 
were likely to be less than 100 mSv, even in the case 
of repeated examinations during pregnancy and ac-
counting for the marginal involvement of the abdominal 
and pelvic regions in radiation exposure during extra-
abdominal radiograms in the past.  
Regardless epidemiological indications the conserva-
tive approach characterizing the LNT model is likely to 
continue to be the basis of the international system of 
radiological protection. It focuses on the optimization 
of exposure, after a given practice involving the expo-
sure to IR is justified. 
Co-exposures
Any exposures or potential exposures of workers and 
emergency workers during a nuclear or radiological 
emergency should be assessed, taking into account also 
the possible development of hazardous conditions [33].
The possibility of individual co-exposures to muta-
genic and carcinogenic agents other than IR as well 
as to agents responsible of adverse effects other than 
cancer and transmissible mutations but also inducible 
by IR (e.g. cataract) is an important reason enforcing 
the need to apply the optimization principle in all ex-
posure situations, including the emergencies, but is not 
adequately addressed in the scientific literature.
For instance, the lung is one of the most important 
site of radiation induced cancer, both for external 
(γ-rays and neutron) and internal (radon) exposure, 
but it is also the main target of other occupational, 
environmental and life style related carcinogens, such 
as tobacco smoke, asbestos, silica, polycyclic aromat-
ic hydrocarbons (PAH), arsenic etc. In addition or in 
alternative to the direct mutagenicity, some of them 
share mechanisms of carcinogenic action such as ROS 
synthesis and epigenetic modifications [34]. Many of 
the aforementioned studies on indoor radon and lung 
cancer show clearly a synergistic action between radon 
exposure and tobacco smoke in lung cancer induction 
[28, 29]. A synergistic effect is also predictable for co-
exposure to two or more lung carcinogens, so the car-
cinogenic action of a given level of exposure to a given 
carcinogenic agent is strengthened with respect to the 
same level of the same agent taken alone.
Skin is a site of radiation induced cancer, although IR 
are recognized to be a carcinogen almost exclusively in 
relation to non melanoma skin cancer (basal cell carci-
noma and squamous cell carcinoma). 
Skin cancer is also inducible by other exposures, be-
ing UV radiation the most important recognized skin 
carcinogen [35]. Both UVB and UVA have carcino-
genic action and share, although to a different extent, 
the same action mechanisms (direct mutations, ROS 
synthesis and epigenetic modifications), but UVB is 
much more effective based on the Erythemal action 
spectrum. Dose-response relationship is not fully de-
fined, but squamous cell carcinoma is mostly related 
to UV cumulative exposure while basal cell carcinoma 
and cutaneous melanoma are more likely associated to 
intense and sunburning exposures, especially during in-
fancy and young ages. Outdoor workers are at higher 
risk of skin cancer due to chronic exposure to solar UV 
radiation. Other recognized skin carcinogens are PAH 
and arsenic [36]. 
Lens of the eye is a biological target of IR, an agent 
known to induce cataract, especially cortical and pos-
terior subcapsular cataract. On the basis of new epide-
miological data (including data from the Chernobyl ac-
cident) and reanalysis of existing data (reviewed by the 
ICRP in the publication 118 devoted to the assessment 
of tissue reactions [37]) dose limits for the lens have 
been consistently lowered, approaching those aimed 
at reducing at an acceptable level the risk of stochastic 
effects for occupational exposure. In fact, the Council 
Directive 2013/59/EURATOM [38] states the follow-
ing dose limits for the lens:
•  20 mSv/year or 100 mSv in five years, in terms of 
equivalent dose, with a maximum dose of 50 mSv in 
one year;
•  15 mSv/y for workers and students aged 16-18 as well 
as for the general public, in terms of equivalent dose.
Therefore, the risk of radiation-induced cataract 
seems to be higher than expected in the past. Radiation 
is not the only cataractogenic agent in occupational and 
environmental settings. UV radiation is known to in-
duce cortical and possibly nuclear cataract, being the 
cataractogenic action mainly attributed to UVB band, 
with no exclusion of the UVA (the last one being maxi-
mally absorbed by the lens) [39, 40]. Outdoor worker 
are at risk of cataract occurrence due to prolonged 
exposure to solar radiation without an adequate eye 
protection. The dose-response relationship is not well 
defined, but the risk is likely to be a function of cumula-
tive exposure.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A new safety culture: adaptation after Fukushima
CC may affect workers’ exposure to a lot of environ-
mental agents, including organic pollutants (among 
which PAH) and solar UV radiation. Furthermore, as 
discussed above, a changing climate may challenge nu-
clear safety, for instance increasing the likelihood of a 
nuclear accident and emergency or amplifying the mag-
nitude of the consequences. 
IAEA states that the external events that could arise 
for a facility or activity have to be addressed in the safe-
ty assessment, and it has to be determined whether an 
adequate level of protection against their consequences 
is provided [41]. 
In Europe, in 2011 the European Commission re-
quested that the safety of all EU NPPs should be re-
viewed on the basis of “stress tests” developed by the 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (EN-
SREG). At a worldwide level, the 2nd Extraordinary 
Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was held in 2012 to review 
and discuss lessons learned from the accident at Fuku-
shima Dai-ichi NPP.
However, in the framework of the radiation protection 
practice, the combination of a nuclear or radiological 
accident with the consequences of CC may challenge 
primarily the principle of the optimization of protection 
and safety, according to which exposures must be main-
tained at the lowest possible levels consistent with the 


















economic and social conditions. An increase in costs 
due to the issues described may limit the effectiveness 
of radiation protection (as in the case of the Fukushima 
accident) and eventually question the nuclear power as 
a means of adaptation/mitigation of CC [42].
A lot has been written on this topic since 2011 re-
garding the safety culture in NPPs. Some consider-
ations are presented here, valid not only for NPPs but 
for all facilities working with IRs, based on the assump-
tion that safety culture means to invest on prevention 
rather than intervention in the emergency phase. This 
can be accomplished by means of “soft” (organizational 
and procedural methods) and “hard” (design and tech-
nical methods) measures [43].
The first organizational measure is that licensees of 
nuclear and also radiological facilities now take into 
account low probability EWEs due to CC among the 
potential accidents and regulatory systems and control 
organisms address extreme external natural events ade-
quately, including their periodic review, and ensure that 
clarity of roles and responsibilities are preserved [33].
This implies a deterministic safety assessment (DSA) 
which predicts the response to postulated initiating 
events, considering also how to cope with those circum-
stances when multiple systems have been affected by an 
extreme event. 
A classic example is the case of flooding, which could 
involve a total loss of power for a significant period of 
time, resulting in a loss of all active accident response 
capabilities. In response to this scenario an organiza-
tional measure is placing backup generators at differ-
ent elevations, especially in areas prone to flooding. 
Then every nuclear and radiological facility should have 
at least one generator with a runtime of several hours, 
housed in a sealed room that is flood-safe, and the avail-
ability of remote generators on demand, in order to 
guarantee monitoring, safety systems and medical care 
for workers involved in an emergency.
In hospitals’ NMUs the DSA has to consider all pos-
sible pathways of dispersion of contamination within 
and outside the hospital (sewers, flows of water due to 
flooding, etc) and ensure accessibility to local control 
points required for manual actions (for instance control 
panels in radioactive waste rooms). In nuclear facilities, 
the safety assessment has to take into account training 
of people potentially involved as emergency personnel 
and medical monitoring and assistance of contaminated 
and/or overexposed workers on site (which entails train-
ing of medical staff of hospitals near the facilities about 
the risks of IRs, radiation monitoring and decontamina-
tion measures) and eventually anticipate harsh working 
environment for workers and long duration emergency 
operations [33]. 
However a comprehensive safety analysis regarding 
CC impacts has to use both deterministic and proba-
bilistic methods in a complementary manner, and the 
hazard analyst should also study the possible depen-
dence between external events and treat multiple sec-
ondary events arising from a single external event, like, 
for example, a tornado that can produce concurrent 
flooding and missiles. Uncertainties in estimating risk 
of accidents caused by external events tend to be great-
er than those associated with other accident-initiating 
events and need to be further explored. Even if great 
confidence can be put on engineering judgment and ex-
perts’ opinion for necessary actions of prevention, such 
as the radiation protection expert or the medical phys-
ics expert or the clinical engineer in hospitals, safety 
improvements depend on safety research giving novel 
techniques, like for instance calculation tools and other 
methods for advanced safety assessment.
In particular, a useful tool against flooding, whose 
effects have a major bearing on safety, can be the re-
gional risk assessment methodology proposed by the 
Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change [44] 
based on the concept of risk being function of hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability, which allows to identify ar-
eas at risk of being affected by floods and supports the 
development of prevention measures to minimize flood 
impacts.
The safety and risk assessments related to CC im-
pacts should be included in the authorization docu-
ments not only of nuclear but also radiological facilities, 
and local authorities should accordingly draw up an 
emergency preparedness and response plan (in Italy the 
intervention plan in compliance with to LD 230/95, art 
115 quarter [45]). Then the authorization documents 
could contain organizational and procedural measures 
against CC impacts, establishing the related organiza-
tional structure (for clear allocation of responsibilities) 
and the arrangements for coordinating activities and 
cooperating with external response agencies in a timely 
manner and throughout all phases of emergency.
For instance, unlike NPPs, hospitals’ radioactive 
waste rooms are not provided with an emergency team 
available 24/7, which would be appropriate in order to 
limit possible radioactive contaminations of high fre-
quented areas. Organizational and procedural mea-
sures could comprise a clarification of roles and respon-
sibilities in an emergency due to an EWE, including 
qualified experts (such as a radiation protection expert) 
with established and recognized skilfulness in the field 
of nuclear or radiological emergency management. 
This personnel, in charge of making decisions to initi-
ate protective actions and other response actions upon 
notification of an emergency, should be available on call 
to coordinate the emergency team (for example in the 
case of flood), having also the possibility of using an on-
site emergency support center.
For new radiological facilities and hospitals, exter-
nal hazards should be considered as an integral part of 
the design and the level of detail and analysis provid-
ed should be proportionate to the contribution to the 
overall risk, as well as the “hard” design and technical 
measures, like the monitoring system of water in the 
radioactive waste room or diesel generators able to face 
a power loss for several hours. In safety organization, 
when “hard” safety measures have to be planned, the 
importance of logistics is clear, meaning the right choice 
and storage of equipment: in radiological facilities, like 
in NPPs, implementation of mobile (i.e. with no power) 
monitoring equipment could be contemplated, so that 
it could be possible to replace failed equipment by por-
table equipment, properly stored in hardened buildings/


















warehouses safe and secure even in case of an EWE 
significantly beyond the design basis. Likewise, the pos-
sibility of manual control of safety devices is essential 
(as for instance the control of tanks of radioactive waste 
in a NMU, when the storage area is flooded and the 
switchboards are out of order), together with proce-
dures in the case of loss of power. 
However, when CC impacts are involved, safety can-
not be just a list of rules and procedures, but it is an 
endless process in continuous improvement and requir-
ing periodic review, because it is impossible to address 
every concern and CC is a constantly evolving variable. 
Then periodic safety reviews are necessary at least for 
the following areas: natural external events, including 
flooding; extreme weather conditions and the related 
systematic monitoring of weather; the loss of safety 
functions and severe accident management.
Moreover, nuclear, and consequently radiological, 
safety culture currently focus on the minimization of 
prompt fatalities, but is this the appropriate metric? 
The approach to radiation protection in the definition 
of the constraints is optimization and determination of 
appropriate dose constraints: a reference level can be 
set, lower than the legal limit, in a situation of emer-
gency exposure when adequate protection can be pro-
vided without causing disproportionate damage due to 
countermeasures implemented or excessive costs. A 
reference level is a level above which it is considered 
inappropriate to allow exposures to occur, although it 
is not a limit that cannot be exceeded. Such reference 
levels could be adopted as good practise objectives for 
radiological emergencies in hospitals and other radio-
logical facilities, weighting costs/risks/benefits sepa-
rately in each case. 
Last but not least, an emergency classification sys-
tem for nuclear or radiological emergencies should be 
developed, on the basis of objective and measurable cri-
teria (emergency action levels) and a list of consequent 
protective actions, which therefore classifies accidents 
considering not only the impacts, like the INES scale, 
but also the countermeasures taken to contain the con-
sequences.
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